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the past is the past. The constitutive parts of what was anthropology, 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, have grown apart. This is even 
true in the mainly American departments, which seem to hold on to the old 
combination. In fact, within their apparently unified departments consisting 
of biological anthropology, archaeology and social and cultural anthropo-
logy, the reality is that these sub-divisions lead, pretty much, separate lives. 
For practical reasons, this is probably a good thing. For example, the lab 
requirements and, consequently, the funding requirements of biological 
anthropology and social cultural anthropology are quite different. Putting 
them together in a single structure just leads to irrelevant tensions.
The old combination is not even necessarily beneficial for research. 
The separation of the constitutive parts has become inevitable. It is right 
that the various disciplines which once constituted anthropology explore 
fundamentally different directions. The same has also happened even within 
the sub-disciplines themselves. What is more, it is not the case that cross- 
disciplinary fertilisation should privilege, or be limited to, those subjects that 
were contained in what was once anthropology. Interdisciplinarity is often a 
good thing and goes quite beyond anthropology. As a social anthropologist, 
I have obtained much more stimulation from working with other cognitive 
sciences than by participating in typical debates of biological anthropology 
such as whether tree shrews should or should not be considered primates.
These issues are one thing, though we should not mix up the practical 
problems concerning the organisation of universities or departments with 
more intellectual concerns, which are quite another. What we should be 
asking are pertinent questions of the following type : would some of the 
scholars who identify themselves as prehistorians not benefit from making 
more of an effort to know and truly understand the implications for their 






work of what social/cultural anthropologists object to in speculations that 
do not centrally integrate the fact that the people the latter get a glimpse of 
act from within their own world and in terms of how they understand it ? 
Would some biological anthropologists not benefit for their work of fully 
taking on board the implications for evolutionary theory of Marx’s old 
injunction that « men make their own history but they do not make it as 
they please » ? Would some of the cultural social anthropologists not benefit 
from making an effort to know and understand, for their work, what the 
other sub-disciplines are documenting ?
Since I am a social anthropologist, this last issue is the one I feel most 
confident in arguing so I will proceed to explain what is involved more fully 
in what follows. For more than a century, social and cultural anthropologists 
have been doing two kinds of quite distinct things simultaneously, though 
often ignoring what this combination implies. One of these things can be 
called ethnography. It focuses on attempting to understand how people live 
in their world on their own terms and the other is often labelled theory. 
Ethnography looks from the inside out, while theory looks from the outside 
in. However, in the end, these two points of view are not as separate as they 
seem at first for a number of reasons. I take these two points of view in turn.
Theory is the attempt to go beyond the specificity of particular cases 
towards something more general. What this generalising concerns is often 
left vague. I would argue that since anthropological “theory” » implies going 
beyond particular cases, it can ultimately only be about the characteristics of 
the species Homo sapiens. That being so, this means that always in the back 
of the mind of the social and cultural anthropologist, perhaps quite far back, 
there should be an awareness of the general questions with which biological 
anthropologists are concerned. Such questions are : what is the relationship 
between our species and other related species ; what are the specific, evolved, 
human cognitive capacities and how do they articulate with the historical 
process ? Indeed, how does our specialisation for historical culture mesh 
with our other specific predispositions ? Similarly, in the back of the mind 
of the social and cultural anthropologist, perhaps quite far back, there should 
be an awareness of what prehistorians are demonstrating : such as the very 
late appearance of the State in human history ; the interconnectedness 
of Palaeolithic societies through trade ; the variety and significance, or 
otherwise, of ritual burial and the significance of technological innovations 
for our history. If such awareness is absent, as I am afraid is often the case, 
the result is that « theory » is situated in an indeterminate fog because it 
is not clear to which kind of phenomena this « theory » might be applied. 
Anthropological theory should be, and only be, about the nature of human 
beings on the planet earth.
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The necessary awareness on the part of social and cultural anthropolo-
gists of the work of biological anthropologists and prehistorians for their 
« theory » might, at first, seem irrelevant for the other job social and cultu-
ral anthropologists have engaged in : that is, ethnography. When doing 
ethnography, the anthropologist’s concern is how to convey, as best she 
can, what it is like to be those people about whom she writes. Such a task 
does not seem, at first, to require the expert knowledge specific to biologi-
cal anthropologists or prehistorians. What is merely required would seem 
to be simply literary techniques of evocation. This « simply » covers up an 
illusion for two reasons.
The very idea that one can communicate to others what it is like to be 
somebody else, to translate in other words, requires a much more complex 
refection than is often much too easily assumed. At the very least, this 
process of translation, if it is to be at all possible, requires the assump-
tion, usually left implicit, of there being common cognitive fundamentals 
shared by the people studied, the anthropologist/translator and the readers 
of her work. This assumption is justified because we know, as biological 
anthropologists have shown, that we are one species and also because we 
are all living in an environment governed by fundamental laws which exist 
quite independently of how they are perceived by any particular group of 
human beings at any particular time. The assumption and implications 
of such facts are, nonetheless, also treacherous since it is easy to assume 
that the knowledge of others is just a variation on our common sense. 
Such an assumption leads to ethnocentrisms. The process therefore needs 
to be very critically and explicitly examined, and this can only be done 
in the light of a reflection on what we can share because of our common 
evolutionary origin and the depth of the differences wrought by the long 
history of mankind. It is for this scrutiny that the general anthropology 
proposed herein is necessary. Such joint scrutiny can move us forward. For 
example, I have argued that much of what we take to be universal features 
of humans throughout their history are, in fact, relatively recent indirect 
products of the State, which only appeared in the last ten thousand years. 
In other words, we need to have in the back of our minds the broad lines 
of the work accomplished by biological anthropologists and prehistorians so 
as neither to underestimate nor overestimate variation. (In reality, it is the 
second danger that is more real in anthropology since cultural and social 
anthropologists are professionally inclined to emphasise variation as a way 
of glorifying their speciality.)
Further, there is an even more fundamental reason for the ethnographer 
to bear in mind our evolutionary and long-term history. Ethnography, in 
anthropology at least, implies explicitly or implicitly asking the remaining, 
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fundamental question of all types of anthropology : how deep are the cultural 
and social differences that we find in human populations ? Ethnographers 
cannot help but have this question in the back of their minds, even when 
they seem to take pride in ignoring it and, consequently, then ignore what 
is going on in disciplines such as biological anthropology or prehistory. For 
example, the deeply relativist work of famous foundational anthropologists, 
such as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, could not, in the end, avoid 
asking these questions : are we really one species and what does this mean ? 
Have the variations in our representations been constrained by our evolved 
characteristics and by our environment ? It is well to note that the same 
questions are raised, or should be raised, by the revival of such extreme 
culturalist theories characterising some of the writers who have been recently 
labelled as ontologists.
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